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Abstract 
This paper investigates the effects of work experience abroad on political opinions using survey 
data from Moldova, a former soviet republic caught in an ideological battle between Russia and 
the West, with high emigration rates to both destinations. Contrarily to studies conducted in 
Africa or Latin America, we find no effect of past migration on democratic participation or on 
critical governance assessment. Likewise, no effect is found on domestic policy preferences. 
The one dimension strongly associated with migration experience is geopolitical preference, 
whereby return migrants from former Soviet countries are more likely to support closer ties 
with Russia, while return migrants from Western countries show higher support for EU 
integration, controlling for economic, demographic and ethnic confounding factors. For 
identification, we instrument individual migration with district level migrant networks. IV 
regressions show that only work experience in Western countries affects geopolitical 
preferences.  
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1. Introduction 
How does international migration shape the spread of values, beliefs and ideologies across 
the globe? The number of people crossing national borders increases as access to information 
and communication technologies improve while poverty, insecurity, corruption, repression and 
other serious economic and political ills persist in some parts of the world. One important and 
often overlooked consequence of cross border movements people, along with effects on labour 
markets and public finances, is migrants’ exposure to new information. In host countries, 
migrants have the opportunity to observe the functioning of different economic, political and 
social systems. They have access to new social and professional networks and media channels. 
They may also experience important changes in their economic or social status. Such life 
experiences may be sufficiently important to affect migrants’ values, beliefs and norms in a 
variety of domains, from eating habits and gender roles, to social norms and political opinions. 
Ideas adopted abroad may then cross borders with return migration, and with migrants’ 
participation networks, media and politics in their countries of origin.  
The transmission of ideas by migrants to their countries of origin, sometimes called social 
remittances, has been documented by a small but growing body of economic research. This 
literature includes cross country and country-specific studies and has mostly focused on 
political opinions.2 
A number of studies analysed the effects of emigration on politics and institutions using 
country-level data. Li and McHale (2006) were the first to propose such an empirical analysis. 
They found that skilled labour emigration in 1990 was positively associated with political 
institutions and negatively associated with economic institutions ten years later. Spilimbergo 
(2009) showed that student emigration to democratic countries improved democratic indicators 
at home for a panel of 183 countries, between 1960 and 2005. Beine and Sekkat (2013) 
examined the evolution of Kaufmann governance indicators between 1994 and 2004 as a 
function of emigration rates to OECD countries. They found positive effects of emigration on 
all institutional indicators except voice and accountability, for which the impact was negative. 
Effects were found to be stronger for skilled emigration. Mercier (2016) analysed the level of 
democracy in developing countries as a function of the head of state’s study experience abroad 
over the period 1960-2004. She found that political leaders who studied abroad improved the 
level of democracy during their tenure, particularly for countries with poor initial democracy 
levels. Finally, a recent paper by Docquier et al. (2016) examined the relationship between 
                                                          
2 One exception is Levitt (1998), who uses qualitative data from Miraflores, a high US emigration 
community in the Dominican Republic, suggesting that migrants transfer a wide range of values and behaviors, 
from clothing and housing styles, to trash management and attitudes towards women. Another exception is Beine 
et al (2013), who use cross country data to show that migrants transfer destination country fertility norms to their 
origin countries.  
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openness to emigration and institutional quality in developing countries over the last 30 years, 
extending the results of Spilimbergo (2009) to all types of migrants.  
Other studies analysed transmission of political ideas by migrants using regional 
variation in migration and voting behavior in specific countries. Pfutze (2012) used data from 
the Mexican municipal elections to show that emigration significantly increased the probability 
for opposition parties to win elections for the first time. Chauvet and Mercier (2014) used 
locality level electoral and census data from Mali to show that return migration increased voter 
turnout and electoral competitiveness, particularly for migration to non-African countries and 
for localities where non-migrants were poorly educated. Omar Mahmoud et al. (2014) examined 
legislative election results at the locality level in Moldova, in relation with locality level 
emigration. The authors showed that the share of votes for the Communist Party were 
significantly lower in localities with higher emigration rates to Western countries. 
Finally, some studies analysed individual political preferences in relation with 
individual or local-level migration. Fidrmuc and Doyle (2006) compared voting behaviour of 
emigrant and non-emigrant Czech and Polish citizens and found that emigrants living in 
countries with a long tradition of full or partial democracy and those living in economically 
advanced countries were more likely to vote for right wing parties in their home countries. 
Perez-Armendariz and Crow (2010) analysed survey data on political opinions of Mexican 
residents and found that Mexican respondents who had lived in the U.S. or Canada had a more 
critical of assessment of Mexican government’s record on rights. Mexican respondents with 
friends or relatives in the U.S. or Canada and those living in high migrant producing 
communities were more likely to participate in civic organizations and protests. A similar 
democratic participation effect has been found in Batista and Vicente (2011) using data from 
Cape Verde. The authors coupled survey data with an experimental framework showing 
respondents living in high emigration communities had higher demand for political 
accountability. The effect was bigger for US emigration than for emigration to Portugal and the 
return migrants enhanced political activism more than current migrants. 
This paper analyses individual political preferences in relationship with individual 
migration using survey data from Moldova. The methodology used is closest to Perez-
Armendariz and Crow (2010), who also use survey questions on political opinions as outcomes 
of interest. The geographic focus is closest to Omar Mahmoud et al (2014), who also use data 
from Moldova and differentiate between Eastern and Western migration.3  
The main contribution of this paper lies in its focus on geopolitical ideas which, to the 
best of our knowledge, has not yet been analysed in relation with work experience abroad. 
While public opinion on geopolitics is only of secondary importance in many countries, which 
may explain why the issue has been neglected by the literature so far, it is of primary importance 
for countries which are at ideological and geopolitical crossroads, as it is the case of Moldova. 
Another contribution of this paper is testing whether patterns of political remittances which 
have been documented in other countries, such as increased political participation or critical 
                                                          
3 The classification of destination countries into East and West is based on the quality of institutions in Omar 
Mahmoud et al. (2014), while in this paper it is based solely on geography. 
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governance assessment, are also observed in the case of Moldova. Finally, we investigate 
migration effects on a number of domestic policy preferences which have not been tested in 
other papers.  
We find that work experience abroad affects individual attitudes towards the two 
external powers competing for political and ideological influence in Moldova: the European 
Union and Russia. Work experience in Western countries increases support for accession to the 
European Union (EU) and decreases support for joining the Customs Union with Russia, 
Belarus and Kazakhstan (CU). Work experience in former Soviet countries is correlated with 
geopolitical preferences, but we find no evidence of causal effects, except on trust in the Russian 
president Vladimir Putin. Contrarily to Mexico, Mali or Cape Verde, democratic participation 
and critical governance assessment are not affected by work experience abroad. The same is 
true for domestic policy preferences. Overall, our results confirm the existence of political 
remittances, but also emphasize the fact that they are context dependent. This calls for more 
country-specific studies and more in depth analyses, both theoretical and empirical, of the 
process by which migrants adopt ideas, values and beliefs and transmit them across the globe.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief overview 
of politics and emigration patterns in Moldova. Data and the empirical strategy are presented 
in section 3. Regression analysis for the effects of migration on geopolitical opinions are 
presented in section 4. Regression analysis for the effects of migration on other political 
opinions are presented in section 5. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Politics and emigration patterns in Moldova 
Moldova is a South Eastern European country of 3.5 million inhabitants, landlocked 
between Romania, an EU member state, and Ukraine, a former soviet republic whose EU 
aspirations have resulted in military conflict with Russia. Moldova shares a common language 
and strong cultural and historic ties with Romania, to which it belonged in the interwar period, 
before being annexed by the Soviet Union. An important number of Moldovan citizens also 
hold a Romanian passport and discussions of reunification with Romania have been on-going 
since its independence from the Soviet Union in 1991. Romania is an important economic 
partner for Moldova, and so is Russia. Around 75% of the population are native Moldovans 
speaking Romanian at home, and 15 % are native Ukrainians or Russians, speaking Russian at 
home. The majority of the population can understand and has access to media in both languages. 
This cultural and geographic position has made Moldova a strategic battle ground for influence 
between the Kremlin and the West. 
The EU has invested significant resources in the development of political, economic, 
and security ties with Moldova. Outcomes of these investments include a number of cooperation 
agreements aimed at aligning legislation, norms and standards to those of the EU in a wide 
range of domains, from respect for freedom of the media, rights of minorities and transparent 
elections, to origin of goods, competition and bankrupt legislation (European Union, 2005). The 
implementation of reforms has been supported with technical and financial assistance by the 
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EU, Moldova’s most important donor. Progress is monitored by the EU delegation established 
in Moldova’s capital. 
The Kremlin has been using a mix of trade and military policies to maintain its 
economic, political and ideological influence in Moldova. Russia is a major export market for 
Moldovan agricultural products and its unique gas provider. Consequently, the Kremlin’s trade 
policies such as embargos on agricultural product imports and gas export prices have a certain 
leverage on Moldovan policy makers. Moreover, Russian troops and military equipment are 
stationed in Transnistria, a breakaway territory situated at the border with Ukraine, populated 
by a majority of Russian speakers and receiving important financial support from Russia. 
Public opinion in Moldova is split into three groups of comparable sizes: those with a 
strong preference for Moldova following a path towards EU integration, those with a strong 
preference for closer economic, political and cultural ties with Russia, and those with no strong 
preference for either of the two options.4 To a large extent this division is determined by ethnic 
and socio-demographic factors. Romanian speakers, younger and more educated Moldovans 
are generally more in favour of EU integration. Russian speakers and older generations are 
more likely to support close ties with Russia.5 Economic and political events, both foreign and 
domestic, such as economic crises in Europe, embargos imposed by Russia and corruption 
scandals involving leaders of pro-European or pro-Russia parties, also affect public support for 
the European and Russian paths, explaining why the size of the three groups varies non 
negligibly over time.6 Another factor which may be influencing public opinion on this issue is 
emigration.  
Since independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, and particularly after the Russian 
financial crisis in 1998, Moldova has been experiencing massive waves of emigration to Russia 
and to Western countries. Between six hundred thousand and one million Moldovans currently 
reside abroad, which represents up to a quarter of the total population and up to 40% of the 
working age population. Top destinations include Russia, Romania and Italy and other EU 
countries. Russia is an important destination because no visa is necessary to cross the border, 
travel by train is relatively inexpensive and a large majority of Moldovans have a good 
knowledge of the Russian language, customs and norms. An important proportion of migrants 
to Russia are males working in the construction sector, mostly informally. Italy is the first 
destination among Western European countries partly due to the similarity between Romanian 
and Italian languages and a certain cultural proximity. Many Moldovan migrants to Italy are 
women working in the informal service sector. Younger generations generally emigrate with 
the objective of settling abroad. Older generations generally emigrate only temporarily, in view 
of increasing consumption for family members remained at home and accumulating capital for 
retirement, housing investments and costly social events. This paper focuses on Moldovan 
                                                          
4 Data on the size of these groups for the period 2000-2015 can be found in the Barometer of Public Opinion, 
published yearly by the Institute for Public Policy. 
5 For example, the 2015 Barometer of Public Opinion report indicates these patterns (Institute for Public Policy, 
2015) . 
6According to data from the Barometer of Public Opinion published yearly by the Institute for Public Policy, 
support for EU integration has fluctuated between 61% in 2002 and 44% in 2012, with a maximum of 76% in 
2007. Variations of similar size are observed in public support for closer ties with Russia. 
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citizens who have worked abroad in the past, but had returned to Moldova at the time of the 
survey. 
3. Data and empirical strategy 
We use survey data collected in Moldova in 2012 by the Institute of Public Policy, an 
independent and non-profit research institute. A representative sample of the adult population 
was selected through stratified two stage random sampling, with districts and size of localities 
as stratification criteria.7 A total 1237 individuals were surveyed from 88 rural and urban 
localities, covering all districts and municipalities. Interviews were conducted at respondents’ 
homes. The questionnaire was available in Romanian or Russian and the choice of the language 
was left to the respondent.  
The survey included questions on respondent’s political opinions, work experience 
abroad and socio-demographic characteristics. Our aim is to compare political opinions of 
respondents who have never worked abroad with political opinions of respondents who have 
worked in either Western countries or former Soviet countries. For dimensions in which 
differences in opinions are observed, we want to investigate whether they can be attributed to 
causal effects of having worked abroad.  
We regress various measures of individual political opinions on migration experience, 
controlling for individual and district level confounding factors. For identification, we use 
district level migration networks to Western countries and to former Soviet countries as 
instruments for individual migration.  
Dependent Variables 
Several dimensions of individual political opinions are analysed in relation with 
migration experience and socio demographic characteristics. They include geopolitical 
opinions, political participation, critical assessment of governance and domestic policy 
preferences. 
Geopolitical opinions are the main focus of our empirical analysis. The choice between 
a European path, leading to closer economic and political ties with the European Union and 
possibly EU integration in the long run, and a Russian path, leading to Customs Union (CU) 
accession and possibly Eurasian Union integration in the long run, has been central in the public 
debate since Moldova’s independence from the Soviet Union. The path which the country will 
take will have important economic and institutional consequences and is still uncertain at the 
moment of writing this paper.8 
                                                          
7 Districts are the main administrative units in Moldova. The country is divided into 32 districts, three 
municipalities including the capital Chisinau, and two autonomous territorial units: Transnistria and Gagauzia. 
The two autonomous territorial units are not covered by the survey. 
8The country has been governed by a pro-European coalition since 2009. A number of steps towards the European 
path have been implemented over this period, resulting in the signature of a deep and comprehensive free trade 
agreement and visa liberalization for short stays with the EU. However, members of the pro-European coalition 
have been involved in a number of high level corruption scandals, including the theft of one billion dollars, the 
equivalent of one eighth of GDP, from the country’s banking system. New elections will be held in October 2016.  
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We analyse several complementary measures of geopolitical opinions. Three central 
measures are constructed based on how respondents declare that they would vote if referendums 
on EU accession and CU accession were organized. The dummy variable Pro EU indicates 
support for EU accession, the dummy variable Pro CU indicates support for joining the CU and 
the five point scale EU versus CU indicates the position of the respondent on the pro CU – pro 
EU preference spectrum, with higher values indicating stronger pro EU preferences. As 
complementary measures of geopolitical opinions, we analyse two additional dummy variables: 
Putin trust, indicating trust in the Russian president Vladimir Putin, and Communist socialist, 
indicating support for the communist or socialist parties, which are traditionally closer to 
Russia. Details of how these variables were constructed and descriptive statistics can be found 
in Table A2.  
We measure democratic participation with the dummy Vote, indicating whether the 
respondent would vote in Parliamentary elections.9 Critical assessment of the democratic 
process is measured with the dummy People govern, indicating whether the respondent believes 
that the country is governed by people’s will. Critical assessment of governance is measured by 
the scale variable Satisfaction governance, indicating respondent’s satisfaction with policies 
implemented by the government in twelve policy areas. Details of how these variables were 
constructed and descriptive statistics can be found in Table A3. 
Our measures of domestic policy preferences indicate which policies are considered top 
priorities in order to improve the socio-economic situation in the country. Respondents could 
choose up to three policies from a list of ten. For each policy, we created a dummy variable 
taking the value one if it was chosen as a top three priority by the respondent. Details of how 
these variables were constructed and descriptive statistics can be found in Table A4. 
Explanatory variables of interest 
Our central explanatory variables are dummies representing work experience abroad. 
Returnee East indicates work experience in a former Soviet country, Returnee West indicates 
work experience in a Western country and Returnee East and West indicates work experience 
in both former Soviet and Western countries. Destinations countries were grouped into East and 
West based on their geographical position with respect to Moldova. The reference category are 
respondents who have never worked abroad. Details of how these variables were constructed 
and descriptive statistics can be found in Table A1. 
                                                          
9 Moldova is a Parliamentary Republic and Parliamentary elections are the most important national level 
elections. 
8 
 
Control Variables 
Standard control variables representing individual socio-demographic and ethnic 
characteristics, which are likely to affect both migration decisions and political preferences, are 
included in all regressions. Gender, age, language, education, revenue, and rural place of 
residence are controlled for in all regressions. Robustness checks include internet access, using 
internet as the main source of information, ethnicity, having a white collar job and being a 
farmer as additional controls. Details of how these variables were constructed and descriptive 
statistics can be found in Table A5. 
Summary Statistics 
Table 1 summarises individual socio-demographic characteristics according to work experience 
abroad. It indicates that individuals who have worked in the West are in a higher proportion 
Romanian speakers, living in urban areas, with higher education and higher revenues. 
Respondents who have worked in the East are more likely to be men without higher education 
and living in rural areas. Few individuals who were above 60 at the time of the survey have 
ever worked abroad. 
Table 2 summarises individual geopolitical preferences according to work experience abroad. 
It indicates that return migrants from the West are significantly more likely to support EU 
accession, while return migrants from the East are significantly more likely to support CU 
accession.  
Table 1 
Socio-demographic characteristics of returnees and non-migrants 
  Non 
migrants 
Returnees 
East 
Returnees 
West 
Returnees 
East and 
West 
Pearson’s Chi 
Square test of 
independence 
Sample size 904 220 83 30   
Female (%) 68.69 37.27 48.19 23.33 97.77*** 
Revenue (scale 1-12) 4.87 4.98 5.67 5.52 73.39*** 
Romanian language (%) 74.89 77.73 85.54 93.33 10.01** 
Age          155.12*** 
18-29 16.04 22.27 20.48 13.33   
30-44 14.93 44.09 31.33 40.00   
45-59 28.54 26.82 28.92 36.67   
60+ 40.49 6.82 19.28 10.00   
Rural (%) 52.65 60.00 38.55 63.33 12.58*** 
Completed higher education (%) 17.37 13.18 20.48 23.33  3.93 
Note: *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05. Romanian language indicates that the respondent chose to conduct the interview in 
Romanian. 
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Table 2 
Geopolitical preferences of returnees and non-migrants 
  Non 
migrants 
Returnees 
East 
Returnees 
West 
Returnees 
East and 
West 
Pearson’s Chi 
Square test of 
independence 
Sample size  904 220 83 30   
EU accession (%)         26.61*** 
For 51.39 47.03 74.70 75.86    
Against 30.74 35.62 16.87 13.79   
Do not know or would not 
participate 
17.87 17.35 8.43 10.34   
CU accession (%)         34.75*** 
For 54.71 69.41 43.37 40.00   
Against 26.25 15.98 37.35 46.67   
Do not know or would not 
participate 
15.17 10.05 12.05 10.00    
Note: *** p<0.01. EU accession and CU accession respectively indicate how the respondent would vote in 
referendums on European Union and on Customs Union (with Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan) accession. 
As socio-demographic characteristics are correlated with migration experience and they 
are also likely to affect political opinions, they need to be controlled for when analysing the 
effects of migration on political opinions. Regression results are presented and discussed in the 
following sections. 
4. Regression results: geopolitical opinions and work experience abroad 
This section presents regression results in which geopolitical preferences are explained 
by work experience abroad and control variables. Baseline results which do not deal with 
migration endogeneity are presented in section 4.1. The identification strategy and IV results 
are presented in section 4.2. 
4.1 Baseline regressions 
We start by analysing the effects of work experience abroad on the probability to support 
EU and CU accession, controlling for socio-demographic confounding factors. Logistic 
regression coefficients are presented in Table 3. They indicate that respondents who have had 
a working experience in the West are more likely to support EU accession compared to 
respondents who have never worked abroad. Likewise, return migrants from the East are more 
likely to support CU accession. Both effects are significant at the 1% level. No effect is found 
for the small category of respondents who have worked in both Eastern and Western 
destinations. Removing this small control group does not affect the coefficients of other 
explanatory variables.  
Control variables show that younger, more educated and Romanian speaking 
respondents are significantly more likely to support EU accession. Language has the highest 
coefficient in terms of size. Gender, revenue and living in a rural area are not correlated with 
geopolitical preferences.  
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Table 3 
Support for European Union and Customs Union accession and work experience abroad. 
 Pro EU Pro CU Pro EU Pro CU 
Returnee East -0.420* 0.706*** -0.448* 0.733*** 
 (0.234) (0.186) (0.231) (0.176) 
Returnee West 0.804*** -0.243 0.783*** -0.222 
 (0.290) (0.282) (0.282) (0.283) 
Returnee East and West 0.527 -0.454   
 (0.440) (0.379)   
Higher education 0.564*** -0.295** 0.568*** -0.300** 
 (0.153) (0.142) (0.150) (0.139) 
Romanian language 1.657*** -1.522*** 1.666*** -1.530*** 
 (0.216) (0.320) (0.210) (0.315) 
Age -0.186*** 0.122* -0.191*** 0.127** 
 (0.041) (0.063) (0.041) (0.063) 
Revenue 0.014 -0.027 0.015 -0.027 
 (0.035) (0.031) (0.035) (0.032) 
Female -0.045 -0.169 -0.070 -0.144 
 (0.127) (0.149) (0.122) (0.144) 
Rural -0.096 -0.011 -0.090 -0.016 
 (0.189) (0.208) (0.186) (0.206) 
Constant -0.745** 1.330*** -0.712** 1.297*** 
 (0.337) (0.322) (0.348) (0.316) 
Chi2  250.91 137.13 252.44 132.05 
P  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
N 1,192 1,192 1,192 1,192 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Logistic regressions. Robust standard errors clustered at the district level in 
parentheses. Returnee East, returnee West and returnee East and West are dummies for work experience in a 
former Soviet country, a Western country and both former Soviet and Western countries respectively. Pro EU and 
pro CU are dummies indicating that the respondent would vote in favour of accession to the European Union and 
Customs Union (with Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan) respectively. Romanian language indicates that the 
respondent chose to conduct the interview in Romanian. 
 
Very similar results are obtained when using the EU versus CU five point scale instead 
of the dummy variables Pro EU and Pro CU (Table B1). 
Table 4 presents regression results for the dependent variables Communist socialist and 
Putin trust. Results show that return migrants from the West are less likely to support the 
communist or socialist parties, but equally likely to trust Vladimir Putin. Revenue, higher 
education and Romanian language are strongly negatively associated with supporting the 
communist and socialist parties. Return migrants from former Soviet countries have higher trust 
levels in Vladimir Putin. Speaking Romanian and having higher education are negatively 
associated with trust in Vladimir Putin. 10 Although the variables explained in these regressions 
represent dimensions of individual geopolitical ideas which are to some extent different from 
support for EU or CU accession, results are broadly consistent. 
                                                          
10If instead of the age variable we include a dummy for people older than 60, its coefficient is positive and 
significant at the 5% level, indicating that the oldest generation are the most likely to declare they would vote 
communist or socialist. 
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Table 4.  
Support for the communist and socialist parties, trust in Vladimir Putin and work experience abroad. 
 Communist socialist Putin trust 
Returnee East -0.157 -0.132 0.484** 0.561** 
 (0.203) (0.203) (0.216) (0.219) 
Returnee West -0.765*** -0.746*** 0.017 0.074 
 (0.271) (0.274) (0.446) (0.447) 
Returnee East and West -0.574  -1.102***  
 (0.528)  (0.347)  
Higher education -0.942*** -0.946*** -0.265* -0.278* 
 (0.193) (0.190) (0.150) (0.151) 
Romanian language -1.651*** -1.661*** -1.705*** -1.720*** 
 (0.244) (0.242) (0.447) (0.431) 
Age 0.097 0.103 -0.084 -0.069 
 (0.068) (0.067) (0.071) (0.069) 
Revenue -0.085** -0.085** -0.058 -0.059 
 (0.036) (0.035) (0.038) (0.039) 
Female -0.078 -0.057 -0.141 -0.066 
 (0.189) (0.189) (0.159) (0.151) 
Rural -0.032 -0.035 0.203 0.185 
 (0.137) (0.137) (0.200) (0.190) 
Constant 0.646* 0.611* 2.970*** 2.865*** 
 (0.342) (0.340) (0.460) (0.470) 
Chi2  233.04 234.51 86.08 84.42 
P  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
N 1,192 1,192 1,192 1,192 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Logistic regressions; robust standard errors clustered at district level in 
parentheses. Returnee East, returnee West and returnee East and West are dummies for work experience in a 
former Soviet country, a Western country and both former Soviet and Western countries respectively. Communist 
socialist is a dummy indicating that the respondent would vote for the communist or socialist party in legislative 
elections. Putin trust is a dummy indicating that the respondent trusts Vladimir Putin very much or to some extent. 
Romanian language indicates that the respondent chose to conduct the interview in Romanian. 
 
Tables B2 and B3 present regression results with additional individual level control 
variables. Results indicate that having internet access and using internet as the main source of 
information are strongly associated with being more in favour of EU accession, while they have 
no effect on support for CU accession. This suggest that any eventual effect of migration on 
geopolitical opinions does not operate through higher revenues financing access to new 
information through the internet. Being a farmer and having a white collar job are weakly 
associated with more pro EU attitudes. Support for EU accession is significantly higher among 
ethnic Moldovans and ethnic Romanians, while support for CU accession is significantly higher 
among ethnic Russians. The effects of work experience abroad are not altered by the inclusion 
of these additional controls. 
The results presented in this section cannot be interpreted as causal effects of work 
experience abroad because unobserved individual characteristics may drive both migration 
decisions and geopolitical opinions. In particular, pro West individuals may be more likely to 
look for jobs in the West, while pro-Russia individuals may be more likely to look for jobs in 
Russia. In other words, regressions may suffer from an omitted variable bias, because we do 
not have measures of individual political opinions before emigration has taken place. While 
there is extensive evidence indicating that the large majority of Moldovan emigration is 
economically and not politically motivated, we cannot rule out the possibility that the 
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coefficients presented in this section are at least partly driven by migrant self-selection.  
4.2 IV regressions 
Our identification strategy consists in instrumenting individual migration with district 
level emigrant networks in Eastern and Western destinations. Networks are an important 
determinant of migration flows. By providing valuable information and contacts for finding 
jobs, housing and dealing with administrative hurdles, they reduce the costs and the risks of 
migration for individuals with emigrants in their personal network.11 Remittances are 
sometimes used to finance emigration of other family members, while family reunification 
policies reduce administrative barriers to emigration for individuals with close family members 
working abroad. When the economic benefits of migration are visible to others, for example in 
the form of better quality housing or consumption of luxury goods, incentives to emigrate 
increase even for individuals with no emigrants in their personal network. We therefore expect 
individuals living in localities with stronger emigration rates to be more likely to emigrate. This 
link should be destination-specific, i.e. higher emigrant networks to Western countries in the 
locality should increase the probability for an individual to work in a Western country, and the 
same should be true for Eastern countries. We expect emigrant networks in the West to play a 
more important role in determining individual migration than migrant networks in former 
Soviet countries because financial, administrative and informational barriers to migration are 
stronger for Western destinations. 
District level data on the number of persons leaving abroad by country of destination 
was taken from the 2004 population census. When constructing the measures for emigrant 
networks, the number of emigrants in each district was divided by the district population in 
order to proxy the probability for an individual to personally know someone established abroad 
or to observe the economic benefits of migration. Destination countries were grouped into East 
and West using the same classification as for the individual migration. We thus constructed two 
instruments, district diaspora West (2004) and district diaspora East (2004) for the two 
endogeneous explanatory variables of interest, return East and return West. In absence of a third 
instrument, we cannot estimate a separate causal effect for the endogenous dummy variable 
Return East and West. This is a minor limitation, as the group of respondents who have worked 
in both eastern and western destinations only represents 30 out of 1237 observations, and this 
particular treatment, which did not show any robust effects in baseline regressions, is not a 
major point of interest for this paper. Baseline regressions have shown that including this 
treatment or leaving it out has no effect on the coefficients of other variables, therefore we drop 
this treatment from the IV regressions.12  
 
First stage regression results are presented in Table C1. Both instruments are highly 
significant. As expected, Western diaspora has a higher influence on individual migration than 
                                                          
11 Social norms for mutual help in Moldova often lead to second and even third degree network connections 
providing logistic, administrative and financial help to new coming  migrants in destination countries. 
12 The respective observations remain included in the sample, thus the control group includes 904 individuals who 
have never worked abroad and 30 individuals who have worked in both Eastern and Western destinations.  
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Eastern Diaspora. An important diaspora network in the West highly increases the probability 
to have worked in the west, and it has a lower but significant negative effect on the probability 
to have work in the East. An important diaspora network in the East increases the probability 
to have worked in the East. The first condition for the validity of instruments is thus satisfied. 
The second condition for the validity of instruments, i.e. lack of correlation with the 
error term, cannot formally be tested because the model is just identified. We will therefore 
discuss its plausibility based on theoretical arguments and additional robustness checks. Several 
possible issues with the validity of the two instruments come to mind. The first one is the 
possibility that emigrant networks affect the economy at the district level, for example through 
labour market or local market effects, with possible consequences on individual political 
preferences. In other words, diaspora networks might not be a valid instrument if they are 
correlated with omitted variables representing district level economic factors. In order to check 
whether this may be an issue, we add district-level indicators of economic activity to the 
explanatory variables in baseline regressions. Results indicate that district level economic 
indicators are not correlated with geopolitical preferences, thus they are unlikely to represent a 
significant omitted variable (Table B4). A second possible concern could be that district level 
demographic or ethnic distribution is correlated with both individual migration decisions and 
geopolitical preferences. Tables B5 and B6 show that district level ethnic and demographic 
composition do not affect individual foreign policy preferences when individual socio-
demographics are controlled for. One final and important validity concern is the possibility that 
diaspora networks affect individual geopolitical opinions not only by affecting individual 
migration, but also by spreading relevant information at the district level. Such local diffusion 
of social remittances has indeed been documented in other contexts. In order to check whether 
this may be a concern, we constructed a measure of geopolitical preferences in respondent’s 
district and checked whether it is correlated with the individual geopolitical preferences.13 We 
have tested the effect of district level geopolitical preferences both on the whole sample, and 
on the sample of individuals who have never migrated. Results presented in Table B7 indicate 
that geopolitical preferences in the district are not significant predictors of individual 
geopolitical preferences. In one specification only is the district average significant at the 10% 
level. The findings that district level geopolitical preferences have no effect on individual 
geopolitical opinions once individual migration is controlled for, and that they have no effect 
on geopolitical opinions for the individuals who have never migrated are consistent with the 
hypothesis that migrant networks affect individual geopolitical opinions through the individual 
migration decision rather than through diffusion of ideas at the locality level. We are therefore 
confident that district migrant networks are valid instruments for the individual migration 
decision. As an additional robustness check however, we will control for district level 
geopolitical preferences in IV regressions.  
Table 5 presents IV regression results, where the probabilities of having worked in the 
West and East predicted in first stage regressions are included instead of the original migration 
variables. An interesting result comes out of these regressions. Work experience in former 
                                                          
13The measure is constructed as the average EU versus CU scale in respondent’s district, excluding respondent’s 
own observation. 
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Soviet countries loses its significance for predicting geopolitical preferences, while work 
experience in the West remains significant, with the expected sign. Robustness checks indicate 
that these results hold when controlling for district-level geopolitical preferences (Table B8) 
and when using an alternative estimation method (Table B9).14 These estimates suggest that the 
correlation between work experience in former Soviet countries and support for CU accession 
is mainly driven by migrant self-selection, while the correlation between pro EU preferences 
and work experience in the West is also driven by the effects of such work experiences on 
political preferences. 
Table 5 
Support for European Union and Customs Union accession and work experience abroad (IV second stage) 
 Pro EU 
(IV logit) 
Pro CU 
(IV logit) 
EU versus CU 
(2SLS) 
Returnee East IV -0.614 -1.746 0.251 
 (0.987) (1.349) (0.751) 
Returnee West IV 5.703** -5.167** 4.211*** 
 (2.543) (2.604) (1.409) 
Higher education 0.627*** -0.479*** 0.406*** 
 (0.144) (0.159) (0.097) 
Romanian language 1.426*** -1.370*** 1.099*** 
 (0.242) (0.307) (0.195) 
Age -0.172* -0.144 -0.012 
 (0.097) (0.160) (0.082) 
Revenue -0.017 -0.017 0.004 
 (0.038) (0.039) (0.026) 
Female 0.004 -0.694** 0.209 
 (0.239) (0.347) (0.186) 
Rural 0.125 -0.127 0.136 
 (0.185) (0.218) (0.139) 
Constant -0.873 3.048*** 0.508 
 (0.589) (0.953) (0.519) 
Chi2 250.65 101.25 . 
P 0.00 0.00 . 
R-squared   0.16 
N 1,192 1,192 1,186 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Robust standard errors clustered at the district level in parentheses. Returnee East 
IV and returnee West IV are predicted probabilities to have worked in a former Soviet country and in a Western 
country respectively (first stage regressions in Table C1). Pro EU and pro CU are dummies indicating that the 
respondent would vote in favour of accession to the European Union and Customs Union (with Russia, Belarus 
and Kazakhstan) respectively. EU versus CU is a five point measure indicating respondents’ position on the pro 
CU-pro EU preference spectrum. Romanian language indicates that the respondent chose to conduct the interview 
in Romanian. 
 
How can we explain the finding that work experience in the West affects migrants’ 
geopolitical preferences, while no causal effects are found for work experience in the former 
Soviet Union? Consider a theoretical framework in which rational voters have incomplete 
information on the effects of various policy regimes on their payoff. Such voters use the 
information at their disposal to choose the policy regime which maximises their expected 
payoff. A life event such as work experience abroad may alter an individual’s preferred policy 
regime through two different mechanisms: by changing the information available to the 
                                                          
14 The alternative method is STATA’s etregress command. 
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individual or by changing the effects of certain policy regimes on the individual payoff. These 
mechanisms suggest two possible explanations for our findings. 
The first explanation is related to changes in information for migrant individuals. Living 
in the West implies exposure to institutions, policies, values and norms which are very different 
from those prevalent in Moldova. Observing the functioning of Western societies, integrating 
social or professional networks and having access to Western media may represent information 
shocks which are sufficient for causing changes in migrants’ political opinions. By contrast, 
due to the legacy of the Soviet Union, institutions, policies, values and norms prevalent in many 
former Soviet country are still relatively similar today. Therefore, work experience in another 
former Soviet country may generally not represent a significant information shock. In other 
words, political opinions are more likely to evolve when migrating to a country with sufficiently 
different institutions, policies and norms.  
The second explanation is related to changes in payoff from certain policy regimes for 
migrant individuals. Work experience in the EU may increase individual payoff from free 
labour mobility with EU countries, while work experience in former Soviet countries may 
increase individual payoff from free labour with CU countries. Indeed, work experience in a 
foreign country is likely to increase the net benefits of re-emigrating to the same country, by 
reducing uncertainty, linguistic barriers, increasing relevant networks and job market 
experience. One important difference between the consequences of EU and CU accession for 
Moldovan citizens is that EU accession would reduce substantial labour mobility barriers to EU 
countries, while CU accession would have no such effects since labour mobility barriers are 
already low for former Soviet countries.15 This may explain why individuals who have worked 
in the EU have higher support for EU integration, while individuals who have worked in the 
East do not become more in favourable to CU accession.  
As an attempt to investigate the relevance of these two explanations, we analysed 
respondents’ answers to survey questions asking them to name the most important benefits of 
joining the EU and the CU respectively. Tables D1 and D2 show the distribution of responses 
to these questions according to respondent’s migration experience. Several points are worth 
mentioning. In the case of EU accession, the most frequent responses are ‘visa liberalisation’, 
‘I do not know’ and ‘there are no benefits’. In the case of CU accession, the most frequent 
responses are ‘cheaper energy’, ‘I do not know’ and ‘there are no benefits’. The distribution of 
responses indicates that free labour mobility is one important reason for supporting EU 
accession, while it is not the case for CU accession. Consistent with our second explanation, 
return migrants from the West are more likely to believe that visa liberalisation is the main 
advantage of joining the EU (26.5 % of them do so, compared to 17.1 % for non-migrants). 
Also consistent with our explanations, return migrants from the West are less likely to believe 
that there are no benefits (14.5% of them do so compared to 23.1% for non-migrants) or to state 
that they do not know what the benefits are (9.6% of them do so compared to 24.8% for non-
migrants). As far as the advantages for joining the CU are concerned, only a small minority of 
respondents consider visa liberalisation to be the main benefit and this response is not more 
                                                          
15 At the time of the survey, visas were needed for Moldovan citizens visiting EU countries, even for short stays. 
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frequent among Eastern returnees. Cheaper energy is also chosen with a similar frequency by 
returnees from the East and non-migrants. It is the case however that return migrants from the 
East are less likely to believe there are no benefits of joining the CU (10% compared to 15% 
for non-migrants) and that they do not know what the benefits are (16% compared to 27% for 
non-migrants). These answer distributions are consistent with our hypothesis that return 
migrants from the West are more likely to support EU accession because their experience 
increases the valuation of free labour mobility with EU countries. However, given the low 
number of observations for each answer category, statistical tests cannot be performed in view 
of providing evidence of causal effects of migration on perceived benefits of EU and CU 
accession. This data limitation calls for more research in view of uncovering the mechanisms 
through which migration leads to changes in geopolitical preferences. 
Table 6. 
Support for the communist and socialist parties, trust in Vladimir Putin and work experience abroad (IV second 
stage). 
 Communist socialist Putin trust 
Returnee East IV -0.649 2.554** 
 (1.067) (1.238) 
Returnee West IV -3.889* -1.253 
 (2.192) (2.309) 
Higher education -0.998*** -0.215 
 (0.222) (0.156) 
Romanian language -1.535*** -1.607*** 
 (0.235) (0.481) 
Age 0.033 0.107 
 (0.132) (0.152) 
Revenue -0.073* -0.034 
 (0.039) (0.047) 
Female -0.206 0.250 
 (0.328) (0.300) 
Rural -0.137 0.047 
 (0.157) (0.182) 
Constant 1.092 1.766** 
 (0.704) (0.750) 
Chi2  243.43 29.06 
P  0.00 0.00 
N 1,192 1,192 
 Note: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Logistic regressions, robust standard errors clustered at district level in 
parentheses. Returnee East IV and returnee West IV are predicted probabilities to have worked in a former Soviet 
country and in a Western country respectively (first stage regressions in C1). Communist socialist is a dummy 
indicating that the respondent would vote for the communist or socialist party in legislative elections. Putin trust 
is a dummy indicating that the respondent trusts Vladimir Putin very much or to some extent. Romanian language 
indicates that the respondent chose to conduct the interview in Romanian. 
 
Finally, we investigate the causal effects of migration on the other measures of geopolitical 
opinions: support for the communist or socialist party and trust in Vladimir Putin. Results 
presented in Table 6 indicate that western migration marginally decreases support for the 
communist and socialist parties and it has no effect on trust in Vladimir Putin. Eastern migration 
does not affect support for communist and socialist parties, but has a positive and significant 
effect on trust in Vladimir Putin. This result may be at odds with the lack of effect of Eastern 
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migration on support for closer relationships with Russia through CU accession. One possible 
explanation is that information exposure on Vladimir Putin’s image in Russia is sufficiently 
different to trigger changes in the perceived image of this politician, while information on 
expected effects of CU accession is not sufficiently different to affect support for this policy 
regime. 
 
5. Regression analysis: other political opinions and work experience abroad 
This section presents a brief analysis of the relationship between other policy preferences 
and work experience abroad, both abstracting from and taking into account migration 
endogeneity.  
Table 7 shows regression results for voting, critical assessment of the democratic 
process and satisfaction with governance performance. Baseline results indicate that 
respondents who have worked in a former Soviet country are less likely to vote, while 
respondents who have worked in the West are more critical towards the democratic process and 
less satisfied with governance performance. IV results show that these effects disappear when 
controlling for migration endogeneity, indicating that differences in political participation and 
critical governance assessment between migrants and non-migrants are likely to be driven by 
self-selection.  
Regression results for domestic policy preferences are presented in tables B10 and B11. 
They indicate that work experience abroad is generally not significant for predicting which 
policies are viewed as top priorities, with two exceptions. Return migrants from the West are 
more likely to declare that encouraging foreign direct investment is a top priority, and the same 
is true for improving the functioning of legislation. These coefficients however lose their 
significance when controlling for migration endogeneity, suggesting that they are also driven 
by self-selection.  
These results suggest that while migrants are differ from non-migrants in terms of their 
political participation, critical governance assessment and domestic policy priorities, observed 
differences are likely to be driven by self-selection rather than by the migration experience. 
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Table 7 
Political participation, critical governance assessment and work experience abroad. 
 Vote 
(logit) 
Vote 
(IV logit) 
People 
govern 
(logit) 
People 
govern 
(IV logit) 
Satisfaction 
governmen
t 
(OLS) 
Satisfaction 
governmen
t 
(2SLS) 
Returnee East -0.459**  -0.191  -0.619  
 (0.205)  (0.228)  (0.438)  
Returnee West -0.123  -0.624*  -1.207*  
 (0.339)  (0.325)  (0.699)  
Higher education 0.113 0.022 -0.224 -0.228 -0.842* -0.722 
 (0.252) (0.284) (0.250) (0.292) (0.495) (0.654) 
Romanian language 0.000 0.015 0.293 0.472 1.651*** 1.538** 
 (0.251) (0.292) (0.407) (0.388) (0.406) (0.646) 
Age -0.120 -0.279 -0.009 0.066 -0.579** -0.325 
 (0.082) (0.172) (0.060) (0.141) (0.231) (0.413) 
Revenue 0.011 0.007 0.069 0.099** 0.340*** 0.341** 
 (0.036) (0.043) (0.044) (0.047) (0.093) (0.141) 
Female -
0.608*** 
-0.933** -0.085 0.028 -0.730* -0.205 
 (0.183) (0.406) (0.145) (0.247) (0.364) (0.872) 
rural -0.352 -0.353 0.620* 0.437 -0.027 0.078 
 (0.277) (0.324) (0.322) (0.388) (0.701) (0.958) 
Returnee East IV  -2.100  0.795  2.928 
  (1.661)  (1.299)  (12.626) 
Returnee West IV  -1.650  -3.963  1.775 
  (2.828)  (4.504)  (3.639) 
Constant 2.621*** 3.670*** -
2.202**
* 
-2.628** 6.173*** 4.456* 
 (0.553) (1.053) (0.605) (1.226) (0.900) (2.601) 
Chi2  19.64 20.61 18.18 21.03 0.05 0.05 
P  0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 777 777 
N 1,192 1,192 1,192 1,192 -0.619  
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Logistic regression; robust standard errors clustered at district level in 
parentheses. Vote is a dummy indicating that the respondent would certainly or probably vote in legislative 
elections. People govern is a dummy indicating that the respondent believes the country is governed by people’s 
will. Satisfaction government is a 48 point scale indicating respondent’s satisfaction with government’s 
performance in 12 policy areas. Returnee East and returnee West are dummies for work experience in a former 
Soviet country and a Western country respectively. Returnee East IV and returnee West IV are predicted 
probabilities to have worked in a former Soviet country and in a Western country respectively (first stage 
regressions in Table C1). Romanian language indicates that the respondent chose to conduct the interview in 
Romanian. 
 
6. Conclusion 
Does working abroad have an influence on political opinions? In destination countries, 
migrants are exposed to a new environment in which institutions, legislation, media, values and 
norms may be notably different from those prevailing in origin countries. Such exposure may 
over time influence migrants’ system of values and beliefs. In particular, political opinions may 
evolve following work experience in a foreign country. 
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We test this hypothesis by comparing political opinions of Moldovan citizens who have 
worked abroad in either Western or former Soviet countries, with political opinions of 
Moldovans who have never worked outside of Moldova. The main focus is on individual 
support for EU integration versus closer ties with Russia, a question which has been central in 
political debates since the country’s independence from the Soviet Union. 
We find strong and robust correlations between geo-political preferences and work 
experience abroad. Respondents who have worked in the West are significantly more likely to 
support EU integration, while respondents who have worked in a former Soviet country are 
more likely to support closer ties with Russia, controlling for relevant ethnic, demographic and 
economic confounding factors. When individual migration is instrumented with district level 
migration networks in order to deal with endogeneity, only work experience in the West shows 
a significant effect on geopolitical opinions. No causal effects are found for work experience in 
former Soviet countries, except increased levels of trust in the Russian President Vladimir 
Putin. 
We discussed two possible explanations for the observed asymmetry in effects for 
Western and Eastern migration. The first explanation is related to information exposure. While 
living in the West implies exposure to very different institutions, values and norms, working in 
another former Soviet country does not provide a similar information shock for Moldovan 
citizens, due to the legacy of the Soviet Union. The second explanation is related to individual 
payoffs from European Union accession and from Customs Union accession. One important 
reason why Moldovans support EU integration is the removal of labour mobility barriers to EU 
countries. As labour mobility barriers are already very low for Russia and other former Soviet 
countries, this does not represent an important advantage of CU accession. Work experience in 
the West may increase individual’s valuation of free labour mobility with EU countries by 
reducing the costs and increasing the benefits of re-emigration. We present some descriptive 
statistics supporting these explanations, but our data does not allow us to formally test their 
plausibility.  
We do not find any evidence of causal effects of migration to Western democracies on 
critical assessment of governance or on willingness to vote, contrarily to what other studies 
have found for Cape Verde, Mexico or Mali. Likewise, no effects are found on domestic policy 
preferences. Moldovans who have worked in the West are more likely to rank foreign direct 
investment and legislation functioning as top priorities, and they are on average less satisfied 
with governance and the democratic process, but these differences seem to be driven by migrant 
self-selection rather than by causal effects of migration. 
When putting our results in the perspective of previous findings on social remittances, 
one noteworthy insight is that the effects of migration on political opinions are context 
dependent. A related insight is the need to better understand when, why and how migrants adopt 
ideas, values and norms in destination countries. Theoretical and empirical research on this 
issue deserves further attention. Additionally to improving our understanding of the role played 
by migrants in the circulation of values, beliefs and ideologies across the world, such research 
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may lead to innovative recommendations for migrant integration policies in destination 
countries. 
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Appendix A: Variables definitions and descriptive statistics 
Table A1 
Work experience abroad 
Variable Type Survey 
Question 
Answer coding Mean Std.dev. Min Max 
Returnee 
East 
Dummy  
 
 
 
Have you 
ever 
worked 
abroad after 
1991? 
 
 
If yes, 
where? 
 
Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, 
Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan1 
 
No experience or other 
countries0 
0.18 0.38 0 1 
Returnee 
West 
Dummy Romania, Italy, France, Germany, 
UK, USA, Greece, Holland, 
Portugal, Spain, Czech Republic, 
Lithuania, New Zealand, Belgium, 
Canada, Ireland, Poland, Austria, 
Croatia, Sweden, Australia, 
Hungary, Poland1 
 
No experience or other 
countries0 
0.07 0.25 0 1 
Returnee 
East and 
West 
Dummy Work in experience at least one 
Eastern and one Western 
country1 
 
0.02 0.15 0 1 
Note: work experience in Turkey (10 observations), Israel (8 observations) were not classified in either 
category. 
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Table A2 
Geopolitical preferences 
Variable 
name 
Type Survey Question Answer coding Mean Std.dev Min Max 
Pro EU Dummy If next Sunday there was 
a referendum regarding 
Moldova’s European 
Union accession, what 
would be your vote? 
 
Yes1 
No, I do not know or 
and I would not 
participate0 
0.53 0.50 0 1 
Pro CU Dummy If next Sunday there was 
a referendum regarding 
Moldova’s Customs 
Union accession, what 
would be your vote? 
 
Yes1 
No, I do not know or 
and I would not 
participate0 
0.56 0.50 0 1 
EU versus 
CU 
Scale 0-
4 
If next Sunday there was 
a referendum regarding 
Moldova’s European 
Union accession, what 
would be your vote? 
 
If next Sunday there was 
a referendum regarding 
Moldova’s Customs 
Union accession, what 
would be your vote? 
pro CU and against 
EU0 
 
pro CU and 
undecided about 
EU1 
 
pro CU and pro 
EU2 
 
undecided about CU 
and pro EU3 
 
against CU and pro 
EU4 
1.92 1.47 0 4 
Communist 
socialist 
Dummy If next Sunday there 
were Parliamentary 
elections, for which 
Party would you vote? 
Socialist or 
Communist 
party1 
Other party0 
0.28 0.45 0 1 
Putin trust Dummy How much do you trust 
Vladimir Putin? 
Somewhat or very 
much1 
Not very much, not 
at all, I have not 
heard of him0 
 
0.74 0.44 0 1 
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Table A3 
Political participation and critical governance assessment 
Variable Type Survey Question Answer coding Mean Std.dev Min Max 
Vote Dummy If next Sunday there 
were Parliamentary 
elections, would you 
vote? 
 
Certainly yes; probably 
yes1 
Probably no; certainly 
no0 ‘ 
0.84 0.37 0 1 
People 
govern 
Dummy Do you think the 
country is governed 
by people’s will? 
 
Yes1 
No; I do not know0 
0.19 0.39 0 1 
Satisfaction 
government 
Scale 0-
48 
How satisfied are you 
on a scale from 1 to 4 
with government’s 
performance in the 
following sectors: 
helping small farmers, 
improving private 
property protection, 
giving more powers to 
the local 
administration, 
fighting crime, 
improving the 
functioning of state 
institutions, changing 
governance, 
improving the 
functioning of 
legislation, improving 
private sector 
development, 
stimulating foreign 
direct investment and 
stimulating industrial 
development. 
 
Sum of satisfaction 
levels for each policy. 
 
Higher values represent 
higher average 
satisfaction. 
 
Note: A factor and 
reliability analysis where 
conducted on the 12 
variables representing 
satisfaction in 12 policy 
areas, indicating they can 
be grouped into one 
underlying dimension. 
Cronbach’s 
alpha=0.914. 
 
6.67 5.87 0 27 
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Table A4 
Domestic policy preferences.  
Variable Answer Coding Mean Std.dev Min Max 
State institutions Improving activities of state institutions 0,13 0,33 0 1 
Crime Combating crime 0,26 0,44 0 1 
Local administration Empowering local administration 0,08 0,27 0 1 
Property protection Improving property protection 0,18 0,38 0 1 
Small farmers Helping small farmers 0,33 0,47 0 1 
Industry Supporting industrial development 0,38 0,49 0 1 
FDI Encouraging foreign direct investment  0,29 0,45 0 1 
Private sector Providing facilities to the private sector  0,21 0,41 0 1 
State Increasing involvement of state in the economy  0,29 0,46 0 1 
Legislation Improving legislation functioning 0,35 0,48 0 1 
Note: All variables are dummies constructed based on the question: What should be done to improve the socio-
economic situation in Moldova? Respondents could to choose up to 3 policy priorities. If a policy was indicated 
as a top 3 priority, the corresponding dummy variable received the value 1. 
 
Table A5 
Socio-demographic characteristics 
Variable Definition Type Mean Std.dev. Min Max 
Romanian interview is conducted in Romanian dummy 0,77 0,42 0 1 
Female respondent is a woman dummy 0,61 0,49 0 1 
Age age group Scale (1-4) 2,76 1,09 1 4 
Revenue revenue group  Scale (1-12) 4,95 2,27 1 12 
Higher education completed higher education dummy 0,17 0,38 0 1 
Rural lives in a rural area dummy 0,53 0,50 0 1 
Internet access has internet access  dummy 0,41 0,49 0 1 
Internet information  internet is the main source of information dummy 0,11 0,31 0 1 
White collar white collar job dummy 0,14 0,34 0 1 
Farmer works in farming sector dummy 0,14 0,34 0 1 
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Appendix B: Additional regressions and robustness checks 
Table B1 
Position on the pro CU-pro EU preference spectrum and work experience abroad. 
 EU versus CU 
Returnee East -0.459***   -0.487*** 
 (0.143)   (0.138) 
Returnee West 0.364*** 0.467***  0.340*** 
 (0.100) (0.103)  (0.097) 
Returnee East and 
West 
0.531** 0.667*** 0.628***  
 (0.214) (0.208) (0.206)  
Higher education 0.312*** 0.330*** 0.323*** 0.318*** 
 (0.096) (0.090) (0.090) (0.094) 
Romanian language 1.240*** 1.246*** 1.268*** 1.250*** 
 (0.186) (0.190) (0.192) (0.180) 
Age -0.105*** -0.059* -0.063* -0.109*** 
 (0.036) (0.033) (0.032) (0.036) 
Revenue 0.019 0.023 0.026 0.021 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.022) 
Female 0.020 0.109 0.098 -0.006 
 (0.098) (0.084) (0.083) (0.093) 
Rural 0.000 -0.016 -0.035 0.006 
 (0.139) (0.147) (0.147) (0.137) 
Constant 1.137*** 0.848*** 0.874*** 1.168*** 
 (0.205) (0.168) (0.167) (0.206) 
R2 0.17 0.16 0.15 0.17 
N 1,186 1,186 1,186 1,186 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01; OLS. Robust standard errors clustered at the district level in parentheses. EU 
versus CU is a five point measure indicating respondents’ position on the pro Customs Union-pro European Union 
spectrum. Returnee East and returnee West are dummies for work experience in a former Soviet country and a 
Western country respectively. Romanian language indicates that the respondent chose to conduct the interview in 
Romanian. 
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Table B2 
Support for European Union and Customs Union accession and work experience abroad including job type and 
information source as additional control variables.16 
 Pro EU Pro CU Pro CU Pro EU Pro EU Pro CU 
Returnee East -0.452** 0.733*** 0.722*** -0.438** -0.438** 0.722*** 
 (0.225) (0.175) (0.173) (0.221) (0.221) (0.173) 
Returnee West 0.743** -0.221 -0.231 0.752*** 0.752*** -0.231 
 (0.292) (0.279) (0.279) (0.288) (0.288) (0.279) 
Higher education 0.475*** -0.281* -0.194 0.368** 0.368** -0.194 
 (0.161) (0.152) (0.150) (0.155) (0.155) (0.150) 
Romanian language 1.685*** -1.524*** -1.526*** 1.691*** 1.691*** -
1.526*** 
 (0.215) (0.318) (0.307) (0.209) (0.209) (0.307) 
Age -0.120*** 0.115 0.116 -0.119*** -
0.119*** 
0.116 
 (0.045) (0.073) (0.073) (0.045) (0.045) (0.073) 
Revenue -0.005 -0.026 -0.017 -0.017 -0.017 -0.017 
 (0.037) (0.034) (0.035) (0.039) (0.039) (0.035) 
Female -0.057 -0.148 -0.154 -0.048 -0.048 -0.154 
 (0.118) (0.141) (0.140) (0.120) (0.120) (0.140) 
Rural -0.040 -0.026 -0.018 -0.049 -0.049 -0.018 
 (0.182) (0.196) (0.196) (0.184) (0.184) (0.196) 
Internet access 0.231** 0.033 0.055 0.206* 0.206* 0.055 
 (0.118) (0.168) (0.170) (0.118) (0.118) (0.170) 
Internet information  0.477** -0.204 -0.191 0.467** 0.467** -0.191 
 (0.225) (0.208) (0.209) (0.232) (0.232) (0.209) 
Farmer   -0.307 0.402*   
   (0.207) (0.226)   
White collar     0.402* -0.307 
     (0.226) (0.207) 
Constant -0.981*** 1.332*** 1.303*** -0.953*** -
0.953*** 
1.303*** 
 (0.353) (0.353) (0.357) (0.356) (0.356) (0.357) 
Chi2  300.60 146.44 257.73 311.99 311.99 257.73 
P  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
N 1,192 1,192 1,192 1,192 1,192 1,192 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Logistic regressions. Robust standard errors clustered at the district level in 
parentheses. Returnee East and returnee West are dummies for work experience in a former Soviet country and a 
Western country respectively. Pro EU and pro CU are dummies indicating that the respondent would vote in favour 
of accession to the European Union and Customs Union (with Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan) respectively. 
Romanian language indicates that the respondent chose to conduct the interview in Romanian. Internet access and 
internet information indicate that the respondent has access to the internet and uses internet as the main source of 
information respectively. 
 
                                                          
16 We have also tried controlling for being active in the labor market. This variable is not significant. Results are 
available upon request.  
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 Table B3. 
 Support for European Union and Customs Union accession and work experience abroad including controls for 
the individual ethnic group. 
 Pro EU Pro EU Pro EU Pro CU Pro CU Pro CU 
Returnee East -0.452** -0.453** -0.452** 0.735*** 0.735*** 0.732*** 
 (0.220) (0.222) (0.225) (0.173) (0.173) (0.174) 
Returnee West 0.700** 0.768*** 0.743** -0.196 -0.237 -0.211 
 (0.279) (0.295) (0.289) (0.283) (0.288) (0.276) 
Higher education 0.424*** 0.477*** 0.474*** -0.242 -0.283* -0.266* 
 (0.162) (0.162) (0.159) (0.155) (0.154) (0.148) 
Romanian language 1.087*** 1.512*** 1.683*** -0.999*** -1.340*** -1.448*** 
 (0.275) (0.214) (0.251) (0.301) (0.223) (0.327) 
Age -0.105** -0.115** -0.120*** 0.104 0.111 0.110 
 (0.046) (0.046) (0.044) (0.072) (0.072) (0.073) 
Revenue 0.002 0.002 -0.005 -0.032 -0.033 -0.027 
 (0.036) (0.037) (0.037) (0.033) (0.034) (0.034) 
Female -0.028 -0.038 -0.057 -0.172 -0.166 -0.148 
 (0.117) (0.118) (0.118) (0.134) (0.136) (0.141) 
rural -0.031 -0.062 -0.040 -0.031 -0.005 -0.025 
 (0.184) (0.183) (0.182) (0.199) (0.199) (0.195) 
Internet access 0.209* 0.213* 0.231* 0.054 0.054 0.035 
 (0.117) (0.119) (0.118) (0.169) (0.167) (0.169) 
Internet information 0.525** 0.449** 0.478** -0.234 -0.181 -0.220 
 (0.220) (0.221) (0.221) (0.213) (0.205) (0.209) 
Moldovan or Romanian 0.930***   -0.819***   
 (0.180)   (0.286)   
Russian  -0.776***   0.844***  
  (0.254)   (0.319)  
Ukrainian   -0.011   0.386 
   (0.253)   (0.302) 
Constant -1.362*** -0.837** -0.979*** 1.658*** 1.168*** 1.264*** 
 (0.327) (0.376) (0.367) (0.449) (0.327) (0.347) 
Chi2  386.68 331.79 303.69 144.70 178.44 153.97 
P  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
N 1,192 1,192 1,192 1,192 1,192 1,192 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Logistic regressions. Robust standard errors clustered at the district level in 
parentheses. Returnee East and returnee West are dummies for work experience in a former Soviet country and a 
Western country respectively. Pro EU and pro CU are dummies indicating that the respondent would vote in favour 
of accession to the European Union and Customs Union (with Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan) respectively. 
Romanian language indicates that the respondent chose to conduct the interview in Romanian. Internet access and 
internet information indicate that the respondent has access to the internet and uses internet as the main source of 
information respectively. Moldovan, Romanian, Russian and Ukrainian indicate respondent’s ethnic group. 
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Table B4 
Support for European Union and Customs Union accession and work experience abroad including controls for 
economic indicators at the district level. 
 Pro EU Pro CU 
Returnee East -0.407 0.711 
 (0.230)* (0.176)*** 
Returnee West 0.739 -0.223 
 (0.264)*** (0.309) 
Returnee East and West 0.610 -0.446 
 (0.398) (0.365) 
Romanian language 1.560 -1.753 
 (0.267)*** (0.304)*** 
Female -0.048 -0.188 
 (0.121) (0.141) 
Age -0.186 0.106 
 (0.038)*** (0.063)* 
Higher education 0.564 -0.388 
 (0.140)*** (0.157)** 
Revenue 0.021 -0.013 
 (0.036) (0.037) 
Rural -0.138 0.034 
 (0.230) (0.162) 
Value production district -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Wage district -0.000 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Production units district 0.002 -0.001 
 (0.003) (0.004) 
Constant 0.588 -0.387 
 (1.733) (1.477) 
N 1,134 1,137 
Note: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Logistic regressions. Robust standard errors clustered at the district level 
in parentheses. Value production unit district, wage district and production units districts measure the gross value 
added, average wage and the number of firms/production units in the district in 2012 (source: National Bureau of 
Statistics). Returnee East and returnee West are dummies for work experience in a former Soviet country and a 
Western country respectively. Pro EU and pro CU are dummies indicating that the respondent would vote in favour 
of accession to the European Union and Customs Union (with Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan) respectively. 
Romanian language indicates that the respondent chose to conduct the interview in Romanian. 
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Table B5 
Support for European Union and Customs Union accession and work experience abroad including controls for 
ethnic composition at the district level. 
 Pro EU Pro CU 
Returnee East -0.397 0.678 
 (0.220)* (0.171)*** 
Returnee West 0.784 -0.265 
 (0.270)*** (0.299) 
Returnee East and West 0.629 -0.454 
 (0.405) (0.380) 
Romanian language 1.516 -1.667 
 (0.290)*** (0.336)*** 
Female -0.046 -0.189 
 (0.124) (0.138) 
Age -0.175 0.104 
 (0.040)*** (0.064) 
Higher education 0.551 -0.389 
 (0.131)*** (0.155)** 
Revenue 0.005 -0.015 
 (0.038) (0.036) 
Rural 0.004 -0.061 
 (0.224) (0.184) 
Ukrainians district % -0.016 0.020 
 (0.013) (0.020) 
Russians district%  0.010 -0.015 
 (0.021) (0.021) 
Gagauz district % -0.010 -0.007 
 (0.003)*** (0.004)* 
Constant -0.589 1.475 
 (0.399) (0.366)*** 
N 1,187 1,190 
Note: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Logistic regressions. Robust standard errors clustered at the district level 
in parentheses. Returnee East and returnee West are dummies for work experience in a former Soviet country and 
a Western country respectively. Pro EU and pro CU are dummies indicating that the respondent would vote in 
favour of accession to the European Union and Customs Union (with Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan) 
respectively. Romanian language indicates that the respondent chose to conduct the interview in Romanian. 
Ukrainians district%, .Russians district % and Gagauz district % indicate the percentage of these ethnic groups in 
respondent’s district (source: National Bureau of Statistics). 
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Table B6  
Support for European Union and Customs Union accession and work experience abroad including controls for 
demographic composition at the district level.17 
 Pro EU Pro CU 
Returnee East -0.388 0.678 
 (0.229)* (0.174)*** 
Returnee West 0.791 -0.231 
 (0.283)*** (0.290) 
Returnee East and West 0.651 -0.457 
 (0.413) (0.375) 
Romanian language 1.658 -1.546 
 (0.220)*** (0.318)*** 
Female -0.043 -0.191 
 (0.125) (0.142) 
Age -0.165 0.101 
 (0.042)*** (0.065) 
Higher education 0.553 -0.388 
 (0.131)*** (0.148)*** 
Revenue 0.009 -0.016 
 (0.036) (0.034) 
Rural -0.016 -0.095 
 (0.188) (0.206) 
Population65+ district -0.039 0.054 
 (0.038) (0.048) 
Constant -0.423 0.882 
 (0.463) (0.561) 
N 1,187 1,190 
Note: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Logistic regressions. Robust standard errors clustered at the district level 
in parentheses. Returnee East and returnee West are dummies for work experience in a former Soviet country and 
a Western country respectively. Pro EU and pro CU are dummies indicating that the respondent would vote in 
favour of accession to the European Union and Customs Union (with Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan) 
respectively. Romanian language indicates that the respondent chose to conduct the interview in Romanian. 
Population65+ district indicates the percentage of population in the district older than 65 (source: National Burau 
of Statistics). 
 
                                                          
17 The results are robust to including dummies for all age groups categories. 
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Table B7 
Support for European Union and Customs Union accession and work experience abroad including controls for 
geopolitical preferences at the district level 
 Pro EU Pro CU Pro EU 
(sample of non-
migrants) 
Pro CU 
(sample of 
non-migrants) 
Returnee East -0.471** 0.746***   
 (0.223) (0.172)   
Returnee West 0.732*** -0.190   
 (0.270) (0.296)   
Higher education 0.567*** -0.302** 0.564*** -0.302 
 (0.153) (0.139) (0.182) (0.232) 
Romanian language 1.606*** -1.493*** 1.523*** -1.603*** 
 (0.230) (0.355) (0.244) (0.358) 
Age -0.198*** 0.132** -0.176*** 0.138** 
 (0.040) (0.062) (0.038) (0.067) 
Revenue 0.009 -0.026 0.058 0.003 
 (0.034) (0.030) (0.044) (0.031) 
Female -0.070 -0.153 -0.310** -0.265 
 (0.124) (0.145) (0.152) (0.207) 
Rural -0.116 0.009 0.055 0.028 
 (0.168) (0.188) (0.204) (0.196) 
EU versus CU district 
(excluding own) 
0.386* -0.268 0.348 -0.186 
 (0.227) (0.332) (0.224) (0.331) 
Constant -1.312*** 1.743** -1.424*** 1.604** 
 (0.500) (0.746) (0.521) (0.703) 
Chi2  300.51 152.32 173.32 90.39 
P  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
N 1,186 1,186 873 873 
Logistic regressions. Robust standard errors clustered at the district level in parentheses. EU versus CU is a five 
point measure indicating respondents’ position on the pro CU-pro EU preference spectrum. EU versus CU district 
(excluding own) is the district average of the variable EU versus CU, excluding the respondent’s own observation 
to avoid endogeneity. Returnee East and returnee West are dummies for work experience in a former Soviet 
country and a Western country respectively. Pro EU and pro CU are dummies indicating that the respondent would 
vote in favour of accession to the European Union and Customs Union (with Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan) 
respectively. Romanian language indicates that the respondent chose to conduct the interview in Romanian. 
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Table B8.  
Support for European Union and Customs Union accession and work experience abroad including controls for 
geopolitical preferences at the district level (second stage IV)  
 Pro EU 
(IV logit) 
Pro CU 
(IV logit) 
EU versus CU 
(2SLS) 
Return East IV -0.343 -1.957 0.465 
 (0.877) (1.375) (0.748) 
Return West IV 5.022** -4.681* 3.570** 
 (2.208) (2.682) (1.425) 
Higher education 0.624*** -0.477*** 0.403*** 
 (0.145) (0.157) (0.096) 
Romanian language 1.422*** -1.363*** 1.076*** 
 (0.242) (0.338) (0.216) 
Age -0.153* -0.157 0.001 
 (0.090) (0.161) (0.081) 
Revenue -0.014 -0.023 0.006 
 (0.038) (0.039) (0.025) 
Female 0.040 -0.730** 0.235 
 (0.224) (0.344) (0.182) 
rural 0.076 -0.082 0.081 
 (0.161) (0.208) (0.117) 
EU versus CU district (excluding own) 0.281 -0.235 0.217 
 (0.221) (0.358) (0.219) 
Constant -1.460** 3.552*** 0.086 
 (0.622) (1.258) (0.704) 
Chi2  260.37 103.33  
P  0.00 0.00  
N 1,186 1,186 1,186 
R2   0.16 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Robust standard errors clustered at the district level in parentheses. EU versus 
CU is a five point measure indicating respondents’ position on the pro CU-pro EU preference spectrum. EU versus 
CU district (excluding own) is the district average of the variable EU versus CU, excluding the respondent’s own 
observation to avoid endogeneity. Returnee East and returnee West are dummies for work experience in a former 
Soviet country and a Western country respectively. Pro EU and pro CU are dummies indicating that the respondent 
would vote in favour of accession to the European Union and Customs Union (with Russia, Belarus and 
Kazakhstan) respectively. Romanian language indicates that the respondent chose to conduct the interview in 
Romanian. 
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Table B9 
Support for European Union and Customs Union accession and work experience abroad, alternative estimation 
method. 
 EU versus CU 
 
Returnee West 
(first stage) 
EU versus CU 
 
Returnee East 
(first stage) 
Romanian language 1.182*** 0.280 1.253*** -0.048 
 (0.204) (0.188) (0.187) (0.120) 
Female 0.122 -0.166 -0.085 -0.792*** 
 (0.099) (0.130) (0.124) (0.113) 
Age -0.050 -0.040 -0.151** -0.437*** 
 (0.040) (0.044) (0.063) (0.055) 
Revenue 0.013 0.041 0.019 -0.011 
 (0.023) (0.038) (0.024) (0.038) 
Higher education 0.367*** -0.101 0.296*** -0.145 
 (0.102) (0.128) (0.096) (0.147) 
Rural 0.060 -0.464*** 0.009 -0.025 
 (0.174) (0.162) (0.140) (0.123) 
Returnee West 2.184**    
 (0.993)    
Returnee East   -0.891  
   (0.623)  
cons 0.771***  1.433***  
 (0.231)  (0.435)  
District diaspora 
West (2004) 
 536.387***  86.481 
  (150.603)  (161.805) 
District diaspora 
East (2004) 
 -14.512***  9.608*** 
  (3.815)  (2.444) 
Constant  -1.397***  0.197 
  (0.422)  (0.352) 
athrho  -0.716  0.162 
  (0.490)  (0.284) 
lnsigma  0.351***  0.304*** 
  (0.046)  (0.024) 
N 1,186 1,186 1,186 1,186 
Note: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Robust standard errors clustered at the district level in parentheses. 
Coefficients estimated with STATA’s etregress command. EU versus CU is a five point measure indicating 
respondents’ position on the pro CU -pro EU preference spectrum. District diaspora West (2004) indicates the 
percentage of the district population living in the West in 2004. District diaspora East (2004) indicates the 
percentage of the district population living in the a former Soviet country in 2004 Returnee East and returnee West 
are dummies for work experience in a former Soviet country and a Western country respectively. Romanian 
language indicates that the respondent chose to conduct the interview in Romanian. 
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Table B10 
Domestic policy preferences and work experience abroad. 
 Legislation State Private 
sector 
FDI Industry 
Returnee East 0.045 0.020 0.247 -0.011 0.122 
 (0.154) (0.122) (0.260) (0.213) (0.146) 
Returnee West 0.349* -0.228 0.283 0.703**
* 
-0.191 
 (0.186) (0.235) (0.241) (0.212) (0.194) 
Returnee East and West 0.201 -0.616 0.013 -0.264 -0.269 
 (0.280) (0.547) (0.555) (0.393) (0.289) 
Romanian 0.235 -
0.283** 
-0.360*** 0.566** -0.254* 
 (0.177) (0.138) (0.120) (0.245) (0.150) 
Female -0.053 -0.003 0.245 -
0.282** 
-0.095 
 (0.123) (0.164) (0.257) (0.119) (0.116) 
Age -0.053 -0.005 0.015 -0.111* -0.024 
 (0.056) (0.061) (0.101) (0.060) (0.066) 
Higher education 0.182 0.125 0.182 0.233 0.125 
 (0.184) (0.128) (0.174) (0.166) (0.261) 
Revenue 0.057** -0.007 0.031 -0.004 0.013 
 (0.026) (0.039) (0.036) (0.030) (0.023) 
Rural -0.014 -
0.329** 
-0.485*** -
0.370** 
-0.386 
 (0.247) (0.165) (0.178) (0.180) (0.239) 
Constant -0.976*** -0.470* -1.278* -
0.702** 
-0.074 
 (0.314) (0.280) (0.652) (0.281) (0.244) 
N 1,192 1,192 1,192 1,192 1,192 
Note: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Robust standard errors clustered at the district level in parentheses. Logistic 
regressions. Dependent variables are dummies indicating that the respondent considers the respective issue as a 
top 3 policy priority. Returnee East and returnee West are dummies for work experience in a former Soviet country 
and a Western country respectively. Romanian language indicates that the respondent chose to conduct the 
interview in Romanian. 
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Table B10 (continued) 
Domestic policy preferences and work experience abroad. 
 Small 
farmers 
Property 
protection 
Local 
administration 
State 
institutions 
Crime 
Returnee East 0.067 0.262 0.201 -0.249 -0.088 
 (0.186) (0.201) (0.278) (0.230) (0.197) 
Returnee West -0.254 0.323 0.384 -0.431 -0.123 
 (0.304) (0.390) (0.319) (0.491) (0.258) 
Returnee East and West 0.279 0.317 0.048 -0.082 0.502 
 (0.429) (0.457) (0.784) (0.424) (0.403) 
Romanian 0.372** 0.216 -0.157 -0.147 0.236 
 (0.159) (0.178) (0.423) (0.254) (0.148) 
Female -0.184 0.199 0.273 -0.006 -0.124 
 (0.129) (0.158) (0.218) (0.181) (0.196) 
Age 0.053 0.063 0.022 -0.152* -0.017 
 (0.054) (0.088) (0.143) (0.092) (0.075) 
Higher education -0.333* -0.229 -0.005 0.430** 0.089 
 (0.192) (0.211) (0.414) (0.212) (0.143) 
Revenue -0.038 -0.003 0.002 0.029 0.080* 
 (0.027) (0.023) (0.053) (0.037) (0.042) 
Rural -0.020 0.116 -0.164 0.305 0.246 
 (0.183) (0.187) (0.277) (0.197) (0.190) 
Constant -0.769*** -2.073*** -2.532*** -1.724*** -
1.633**
* 
 (0.244) (0.377) (0.885) (0.544) (0.514) 
N 1,192 1,192 1,192 1,192 1,192 
Note: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Robust standard errors clustered at the district level in parentheses. Logistic 
regressions. Dependent variables are dummies indicating that the respondent considers the respective issue as a 
top 3 policy priority. Returnee East and returnee West are dummies for work experience in a former Soviet country 
and a Western country respectively. Romanian language indicates that the respondent chose to conduct the 
interview in Romanian. 
 
36 
 
Table B11  
FDI, legislation functioning and work experience abroad (IV second stage) 
 FDI Legislation 
Returnee West IV -1.895 0.694 
 (3.573) (2.767) 
Returnee East IV 0.139 0.587 
 (1.004) (0.983) 
Romanian 0.682*** 0.241 
 (0.260) (0.200) 
Female -0.301 0.044 
 (0.249) (0.241) 
Age -0.112 0.001 
 (0.114) (0.114) 
Higher education 0.193 0.213 
 (0.170) (0.181) 
Revenue 0.014 0.060 
 (0.045) (0.036) 
Rural -0.488** -0.021 
 (0.211) (0.254) 
Constant -0.662 -1.319** 
 (0.747) (0.604) 
N 1,192 1,192 
Note: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Robust standard errors clustered at the district level in parentheses. Logistic 
regressions. Dependent variables are dummies indicating that the respondent considers the respective issue as a 
top 3 policy priority. Returnee East IV and returnee West IV are predicted probabilities to have worked in a former 
Soviet country and in a Western country respectively (first stage regressions in Table C1 ). Romanian language 
indicates that the respondent chose to conduct the interview in Romanian. 
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Appendix C. First stage regressions. 
 
Table C1 
Probability to have worked in the East and West as a function of district diaspora to East and West in 2004 
 Returnee East Returnee West 
District diaspora West (2004) 229.087 1,143.828*** 
 (236.098) (327.294) 
District diaspora East (2004) 15.275*** -29.592*** 
 (3.997) (8.540) 
Higher education -0.315 -0.229 
 (0.244) (0.303) 
Romanian language -0.106 0.627** 
 (0.194) (0.285) 
Age -0.779*** -0.097 
 (0.090) (0.100) 
Revenue -0.014 0.116** 
 (0.060) (0.058) 
Female -1.417*** -0.371 
 (0.204) (0.274) 
rural -0.030 -0.812*** 
 (0.221) (0.302) 
Constant 0.419 -2.743*** 
 (0.570) (0.679) 
Chi2  302.66 47.79 
P  0.00 0.00 
N 1,192 1,192 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Logistic regressions. Robust standard errors clustered at the district level in 
parentheses. District diaspora West (2004) indicates the percentage of the district population living in the West in 
2004. District diaspora East (2004) indicates the percentage of the district population living in the East in 2004. 
Returnee East and returnee West are dummies for work experience in a former Soviet country and a Western 
country respectively. Romanian language indicates that the respondent chose to conduct the interview in 
Romanian. 
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Appendix D: Perceived benefits of joining the European Union and the Customs Union 
Table D1 
Biggest advantage of joining the European Union and work experience abroad. 
 Non migrants Returnees East Returnees West Returnees East and West 
Visa liberalisation 155 28 22 5 
column % 17,15 12,73 26,51 16,67 
Jobs 64 36 7 3 
column % 7,08 16,36 8,43 10 
Higher living standards 87 18 8 9 
column % 9,62 8,18 9,64 30 
Economic development 41 10 9 2 
column % 4,54 4,55 10,84 6,67 
Higher wages and pensions 28 11 5 1 
column % 3,1 5 6,02 3,33 
There are no benefits 209 66 12 2 
column % 23,12 30 14,46 6,67 
I do not know 224 42 8 6 
column % 24,78 19,09 9,64 20 
Other 79 8 10 2 
column % 8,73 3,63 12,01 6,66 
Total 904 220 83 30 
column % 100 100 100 100 
Note: Distribution of answers to the question: “What is the biggest advantage of joining the European Union?”. 
Response categories with fewer than 5% of responses for at least one column were grouped together in the category 
other. They include: cheaper energy, lower prices, better collaboration, financial help, respect for the retired, less 
corruption, more exports, more investments, development of education and culture, improvement of the judicial 
system, respect of rights, communication language, infrastructure development, bigger market, tourism 
development, change in people’s way of thinking and acting, return of migrants, solution for the political crisis, 
better local infrastructure, I have relatives in the EU, Romanian language will keep its status and security 
maintenance. 
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Table D2 
Biggest advantage of joining the Customs Union and work experience abroad. 
 Non migrants Returnees East Returnees West Returnees East and West 
Visa liberalisation 38 13 1 0 
Column % 4,2 5,91 1,2 0 
Jobs 53 28 4 2 
Column % 5,86 12,73 4,82 6,67 
Cheaper energy 145 40 12 5 
Column % 16,04 18,18 14,46 16,67 
Financial aid 47 12 2 1 
Column % 5,2 5,45 2,41 3,33 
Product exports 32 12 8 2 
Column % 3,54 5,45 9,64 6,67 
Higher living standards 48 10 1 1 
Column % 5,31 4,55 1,2 3,33 
Economic development 39 5 6 4 
Column % 4,31 2,27 7,23 13,33 
Access to markets 42 12 2 1 
Column % 4,65 5,45 2,41 3,33 
No benefits 138 22 28 8 
Column % 15,27 10 33,73 26,67 
I do not know 244 36 15 6 
Column % 26,99 16,36 18,07 20 
Other 78 30 4 0 
Column % 8,62 13,61 4,8 0 
Total 904 220 83 30 
Column % 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Note: Distribution of answers to the question: “What is the biggest advantage of joining the Customs Union?”. 
Response categories with fewer than 5% of responses for at least one column were grouped together in the category 
other. They include: they have everything, lower prices, better collaboration, higher wages and pensions, respect 
for the retired, reduction of corruption, it is closer, higher investments, resolution of the Transnistrian conflict, 
improvement of education and culture, improvement of the judicial system, easy language of communication, 
common past, Moldova would get rid of debts, tourism development, lower customs duties, return of Migrants, 
many Moldovans have Russian citizenship, introduction of quality standards, better governance, closed borders, I 
have family there. 
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